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REAL PROPERTY: PURCHASE, SALE,
TITLE, AND OWNERSHIP
by
Charles R. Johnson *
ONSIDERABLE judicial and legislative activity took place in the
area of real property law during the survey period. Thus, this Arti-
cle will address only those matters of the greatest significance. The
topics covered by this paper include purchase and sale, title and owner-
ship, mortgages, mechanics' and materialmen's liens, condemnation, real
estate brokers, condominium law, and legislation. Other topics relating to
real estate are the subjects of other articles in this issue.
I. PURCHASE AND SALE
Covenants and Conditions. The builder and seller of a residence received
the remedy of specific performance in Claflin v. Hillock Homes, Inc. I In
Claflin the buyer and seller entered into a contract for the sale of a house.
The contract was conditioned on the buyer's ability to sell her Houston
townhouse and obtain a conventional loan at 13.5% annual interest prior
to sale. The buyer later waived the condition pertaining to the sale of her
Houston townhouse, but she was unable to obtain permanent financing at
an interest rate of 13.5%. Subsequently, the seller and buyer rescinded the
contract and entered into a second contract. The parties intentionally
omitted from the second contract the condition requiring the sale of the
buyer's Houston townhouse. This second contract, however, contained a
condition that the buyer obtain a conventional loan at 16% annual interest,
which loan she successfully obtained. The buyer refused to perform and
the seller sued for specific performance. The buyer maintained that she
should not be forced to purchase the residence and comply with the con-
tract because to do so would be inequitable in light of the following cir-
cumstances: (1) interest rates on the "swing loan" with which she planned
to make her down payment had increased from an expected 14% to 21%
per annum; (2) all of the liquid assets with which she had planned to make
payments until her Houston townhouse could be sold had been spent on
* B.B.A., Texas A & M University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Pettit & Martin, Dallas, Texas. The author gratefully acknowledges and thanks Wal-
ter G. Pettey, II, Irene L. Hosford, and Melanie L. Wright of Pettit & Martin, and Mark
Minton, law clerk for Chief Justice Pope of the Texas Supreme Court, for their assistance in
the preparation of this Article.
1. 645 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
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federal taxes instead; and (3) she had been unable to sell her Houston
townhouse. The court of appeals noted that none of these circumstances
had been included in the contract as conditions precedent. 2 The buyer was
merely attempting to avoid the contractual remedy of specific performance
by claiming hardship. 3 The court noted that under Texas law a claim of
hardship is an insufficient ground for denying specific performance of a
land contract fairly made absent a showing of overreaching or misleading
by the plaintiff so as to render the contract unconscionable. 4 Accordingly,
the court held that the contract was freely and voluntarily made and that
the plaintiff thus had not misled or overreached the defendant in any
respect.5
The buyer in Claflin also asserted that the seller had waived its right to
specific performance by continuing to offer the residence for sale following
notice from the buyer that she would not close the contract. 6 The buyer
claimed that the seller had thereby evidenced an intent to treat the contract
as breached. The court held that merely offering the residence for sale to
others neither constituted an injury to the buyer nor evidenced an inten-
tion inconsistent with performance of the contract by the seller. 7 On the
contrary, the seller remained ready, willing, and able to perform under the
contract at all times. The court of appeals further held that the trial court
had correctly awarded $21,862.20 in damages to the seller in an equitable
accounting. 8 The award represented the interest that had accrued on an
interim construction loan that the seller was forced to maintain beyond the
scheduled closing date. The court would not allow the buyer to breach the
very contract that she had drafted and then state that the seller could not
recover by an equitable accounting the expenses it incurred as a direct
result of the buyer's actions. 9
2. Id. at 633.
3. Id.
4. Id. The court cited Bennet v. Copeland, 149 Tex. 474, 481, 235 S.W.2d 605, 609
(1951), in which the court stated that "[m]ere hardship is not sufficient ground for denial of
the right to specific performance of a contract otherwise subject to enforcement ....
[Clourts cannot arbitrarily refuse specific performance of a contract . . . because subsequent
events disclose that it will result in a loss to defendant .... " 149 Tex. at 481, 235 S.W.2d at
609. The court of appeals in Claflin observed that the buyer was approximately 40 years of
age and highly educated and that she was married to an attorney who advised her and
actively participated in drafting the second contract. 645 S.W.2d at 631. Moreover, the
court noted that the vendor signed the second contract virtually as the purchaser and her
husband had drafted it. Id. at 632.
5. Id. at 633.
6. Id. at 635.
7. Id. In so holding the court distinguished this case from authorities cited by the
seller, including Kluck v. Leuschner, 70 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1934, writ
ret'd n.r.e) (seller's conduct in voluntarily assuming and paying off loan that was to have
been assumed by purchaser, prior to loan's maturity, evidenced intent to treat contract as
breached and waived right to seek specific performance), and Hamon v. Allen, 457 S.W.2d
384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970, no writ) (seller who failed to diligently comply
with all provisions of sale contract not entitled to equitable remedy of specific performance).
8. 645 S.W.2d at 635 (citing Hage v. Westgate Square Commercial, 598 S.W.2d 709
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (carrying charges not damages per se, but a
form of an equitable accounting)).
9. 645 S.W.2d at 635.
[Vol. 38
REAL PROPERTY- PURCHASE, SALE
In Hudson v. Wakefield' the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts' determination that a contract was not enforceable as a matter of
law and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the
breach that occurred was a material breach justifying repudiation of the
contract by the seller."l The lower courts had ruled that the disputed in-
strument never attained the status of a binding contract because the ear-
nest money check was returned for insufficient funds. The supreme court
stated that the primary issue was whether the earnest money provision
amounted to a condition precedent or a mere convenant.12 If the earnest
money provision constituted a covenant, as the purchasers argued, then the
sellers would not be excused from performance under the agreement be-
cause of the return of the earnest money check.' 3 If, however, the earnest
money provision amounted to a condition precedent to formation of the
contract, as argued by the sellers, then no contract was ever formed., 4 Af-
ter reviewing and distinguishing earlier Texas cases,15 the supreme court
stated that "'[i]t is a rule of construction that a forfeiture by finding a
condition precedent is to be avoided when possible under another reason-
able reading of the contract.' "16 An examination of the entire contract led
the court to rule that the earnest money provision was intended as a pen-
alty for breach and not as a condition precedent to formation of the con-
tract. 17 The material nature of the breach is generally a factual question.1
8
Accordingly, the supreme court remanded to the trial court for a determi-
nation of whether the return of the earnest money check because of insuffi-
cient funds was such a material breach of the contract that the seller's
repudiation was warranted. 19
10. 645 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1983).
11. Id at 431.
12. Id at 428-29.
13. Id
14. Id
15. Antwine v. Reed, 145 Tex. 521, 523, 199 S.W.2d 482, 484 (1947) (parties did not
have meeting of minds at time of purported acceptance because space in proposed contract
for insertion of earnest money amount left blank); Bowles v. Fickas, 140 Tex. 312, 314, 167
S.W.2d 741, 742-43 (1943) (instrument remained mere offer by seller to be bound by terms
specified in instrument if buyer would sign instrument and deposit earnest money with
bank); Slam Properties v. Pickett, 495 S.W.2d 381, 383-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ
refd. n.r.e.) (instrument never constituted contract because offer to sell conditioned upon
deposit of earnest money that was not deposited).
16. 645 S.W.2d at 430 (quoting Schwarz-Jordan, Inc. v. Delisle Constr. Co., 569 S.W.2d
878, 881 (Tex. 1978)). The court applied rules of construction governing contracts as op-
posed to escrows relying on Cowman v. Allen Monuments, Inc., 500 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ) (contracts for sale of real estate requiring earnest
money payments are not escrow agreements). 645 S.W.2d at 430. In Cowman the Texar-
kana court of appeals held that, because the instrument in question was simply a contract for
the sale of real estate requiring an earnest money payment and was not an escrow agree-
ment, the law of contracts and equitable principles of specific performance applied, rather
than the law of escrows. 500 S.W.2d at 226.
17. 645 S.W.2d at 430 (disapproving Slam Properties v. Pickett, 495 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ refd n.r.e.), to extent it conflicted with holding).
18. 645 S.W.2d at 431.
19. Id
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In Ryan Mortgage Investors v. Fleming- Wood 20 the Fort Worth court of
appeals ruled in favor of the purchaser in his suit for breach of a real estate
contract and for fraud.21 The breach arose when the sellers were unable to
deliver marketable title to the property. Paragraph 17 of the contract
provided:
In the event the SELLER is unable to convey title to the Property in
accordance with Paragraph 12 of this Contract, BUYER may at its
option terminate this Contract by written notice delivered to SELLER
on or prior to the scheduled closing date (as deferred by any post-
ponement in accordance with Paragraph 19); otherwise BUYER shall
be conclusively deemed to have accepted SELLER's title.22
The buyer did not know until after he had signed the contract that the
property was the subject of litigation and that a notice of lis pendens had
been filed by a third party who had previously contracted to purchase the
property. It was undisputed that the sellers could not deliver good and
marketable title at the closing, which had already been postponed once to
allow the sellers more time to clear up the pending litigation and have the
lis pendens notice removed. The sellers' legal position was that the reme-
dies that paragraph 17 afforded the buyer were exclusive. The sellers ar-
gued that their failure to have marketable title at the closing was excused
because the buyer had not terminated the contract by written notice prior
to the closing date. The court of appeals held that although paragraph 17
gave the buyer a remedy that he did not have at common law, that fact did
not exclude his common law remedies.23 A buyer may pursue any remedy
that the law affords in addition to the remedy provided in the contract.
24
Although, under the terms of the contract, the buyer may have been
deemed to have accepted the sellers' title, he could still pursue common
law remedies for defects in that title.25 With the lis pendens notice in
place, the buyer received a title worth much less than the one he had bar-
gained for and therefore had a cause of action for breach of the contract.
26
As to the form of relief for breach of a contract to convey marketable
title, the court stated that the measure of damages would generally be the
difference between the contract price and the market value of the property
at the time of the breach. 27 The court stated:
It is only where the vendor is unable to make title through no fault of
his own that the buyer is limited in his recovery to a return of the
purchase price and special damages. In other words, the general rule
still applies if the vendor is guilty of fraud. It also still applies if the
vendor is not guilty of fraud, but nevertheless "disables" himself from
20. 650 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ rerd n.r.e.).
21. Id at 938.
22. Id. at 933.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 933-34.
26. Id. at 934.
27. Id at 935.
[Vol. 38
REAL PROPERTY PURCHASE, SALE
carrying out the contract or fails or refuses to perform.28
The court further stated that title is not marketable if clouded by any out-
standing contract, covenant, interest, lien, or mortgage sufficient to form a
basis of litigation, or if it exposes the holder to a reasonable probability of
litigation with the least chance of defeat.29 The buyer testified that he
would not have entered into the contract had he known about the pending
litigation and the fact that a lis pendens notice would be filed shortly after
he signed the contract. The buyer was therefore entitled to the benefit of
his bargain, which the jury found to be $2,000,000.30 He was also entitled
to exemplary damages because the evidence was sufficient to support such
an award.31 This case may be of particular interest to practitioners be-
cause paragraph 17 of the disputed contract is essentially the same as a
provision in certain printed forms currently in wide usage, such as a form
published by the Greater Dallas Board of Realtors.
Shuler v. Gordin32 involved a suit by buyers seeking specific perform-
ance of a contract for the sale of an apartment complex. Performance of
the contract was expressly conditioned upon the first lienholder's written
approval of both the conveyance of the premises and the execution of a
subordinate deed of trust securing the wraparound note to be given at clos-
ing by the buyers. The seller argued that written approval had not been
obtained from the first lienholder because the lienholder's purported ap-
proval attempted to impose additional terms upon the parties' agreement
by requiring the buyers to assume personal liability for the first lien debt
and an increase in the interest rate on such debt. The purchasers testified
unequivocably, however, that they were willing to assume personal liabil-
ity on the wraparound note. The court found that a fact question therefore
existed as to whether the added features rendered the lienholder's written
approval defective. 33 The evidence showed that the purchasers had of-
fered to escrow an amount of funds equal to the seller's maximum poten-
tial liability for the increased interest rate. The seller would thus be
insulated from greater liability in the event the buyers defaulted on the
wraparound note. The court held this evidence sufficient to support the
jury's finding that the "written approval" of the first lienholder had been
28. Id The sellers argued that their inability to convey marketable title was through no
fault of their own. The court found, however, that the sellers had filed a lawsuit arising
under an earlier contract against third parties nearly two months before contracting to sell
the property to the buyer. The third parties had in turn filed a counterclaim for specific
performance and a lis pendens in that suit. Id. at 932.
29. Id at 936. Although it was undisputed that the sellers could not convey marketable
title, the Court nevertheless commented favorably upon the trial court's charge defining
marketable title. The trial court charged: "'Marketable title' means a title free and clear
from reasonable doubt as to matters of law and fact, such a title as a prudent man, advised
of the facts and their legal significance would willingly accept." Id
30. Id
31. Id at 937. The court of appeals reformed the trial court's order by vacating an
award to the buyer of $528,000 for the rental value of the premises. Id at 938.
32. 644 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1982).
33. Id. at 448.
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obtained. 34
Options. The Dallas court of appeals ruled in Weitzman v. Steinberg35 that
an elaborate letter-option agreement was merely an unenforceable agree-
ment to agree among joint venturers.36 Weitzman, the optionee and a
12.5% venturer, sued for specific performance of the option agreement,
which provided that upon its exercise Weitzman would increase his owner-
ship in the venture to 90%. Although the agreement stated that the ulti-
mate economic effect of the transaction would be that Weitzman would
obtain an additional 77.5% interest in the venture, the court noted that the
parties intentionally failed to indicate exactly what Weitzman was to
purchase and provided, instead, for five alternative arrangements. 37 The
agreement provided that the parties would determine the form of the ac-
quisition at a later time in light of their respective tax consequences. The
optionor group refused to honor the option agreement when Weitzman
attempted to exercise it, and Weitzman contended that the agreement was
enforceable because it left only matters of form to future agreement and
thus was sufficiently definite to warrant enforcement. The court disagreed,
holding that the agreement omitted not only the form and structure of the
proposed transaction but also the very essence of an option to purchase, a
description of the interest that was to be purchased. 38 Whether the parties
intended Weitzman to purchase an interest in the property or an interest in
the joint venture was unclear, and the option agreement was therefore
merely an agreement to agree and as such was unenforceable. 39
Issues of homestead law were litigated in Zable v. Henry,40 in which Mr.
Zable, without the joinder of his wife, granted an option to purchase cer-
tain real property that constituted the couple's homestead. Although the
language of the option appeared to grant merely a ten-year right of first
refusal, both parties to the litigation interpreted the instrument as granting
a right of first refusal for ten years followed by an absolute option to
purchase the property at a stated price. The Dallas court of appeals stated
that, although it did not agree, it was bound to treat the instrument in
accordance with this interpretation. 4'
The primary issue in Zable was whether the option was presently void.
34. Id. at 449. On motion for rehearing the supreme court remanded in part to the
court of appeals for consideration of factual insufficiency points of error that the court of
appeals had failed to consider. Id.
35. 638 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
36. Id. at 176.
37. Id. at 175.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 176. The court also rejected Weitzman's contention that the optionor group
should be estopped from denying the existence of a contract because Weitzman had been
encouraged to expend funds in reliance upon the agreement. Id. The court stated: "The
doctrine of promissory estoppel enforces obligations which would otherwise be barred at
law, e.g., an oral contract for the sale of real property, and does not create essential contrac-
tual elements where none before existed." Id.
40. 649 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
41. Id at 137.
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The court noted that Texas decisions have adhered strictly to the principle
that homestead transactions executed by one spouse are not void but are
merely inoperative while the property remains a nonsigning spouse's
homestead.42 A purchase that is frustrated by the refusal of the vendor's
spouse to ratify the sale can result in an action for damages against the
signing vendor, which action necessarily is predicated on the premise that
the instrument is not void.43 The court in Zable noted that although the
option in question would be absolutely exercisable in 1988, the homestead
status might cease prior to that time and the option would then become
enforceable by specific performance. 44 If the homestead status of the
property were to continue until 1988 and the option were then exercised
but Mrs. Zable refused to join in a conveyance, then the optionee would
have a cause of action for damages against Mr. Zable.45 The court held
that under either approach the option was currently valid and should not
be declared void merely because the homestead nature of the property and
Mrs. Zable's failure to join in the transaction rendered the option tempora-
rily unenforceable. 46
Definition of Sale. In Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause47 the Texas
Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the sale of an oil and gas lease
constitutes a sale of a determinable fee interest in oil and gas in place. 48 In
Cherokee a deed conveyed the surface rights to the subject property to the
Cherokee Water Company, reserved the mineral estate to the grantors, and
granted Cherokee a preferential right to acquire the mineral estate in the
event of a sale by the grantor. The grantor subsequently executed an oil
and gas lease to a third party. The issue before the supreme court was
whether the oil and gas lease constituted a sale giving rise to Cherokee's
preferential right to acquire the minerals. The court stated that the term
42. Id (citing Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hodge, 147 Tex. 115, 119, 213 S.W.2d 456, 458
(1948); Kunkel v. Kunkel, 515 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Davis v. Crockett, 398 S.W.2d 302, 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, no writ); Lewis
v. Brown, 321 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Weinert
v. Cooper, 107 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1937, writ dism'd)).
43. 649 S.W.2d at 138 (citing Goffv. Jones, 70 Tex. 572, 577, 8 S.W. 525, 527 (1888);
Nelson v. Jenkins, 214 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948, writ refd)).
44. 649 S.W.2d at 138.
45. 1d.
46. Id. at 138-39. In distinguishing the instant case from cases involving deeds of trust
and levies of execution on homestead property, the court, quoting Lewis v. Brown, 321
S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ rerd n.r.e.), stated:
Deeds of trust and levies of execution or attachment never become liens on
property which is homestead at the time of their execution or levy, even after
the homestead status ceases to exist. This is so because Article 16, sec. 50, of
the Texas Constitution . . . declares them to be void. The subsequent cessa-
tion of the homestead exemption does not give them validity. But a contract to
sell a homestead is not void, and not unlawful but good and valid. Wright v.
Hayes, 34 Tex. 253. It is merely unenforceable so long as the homestead sta-
tus exists.
649 S.W.2d at 138 (emphasis supplied by the court).
47. 641 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. 1982).
48. Id. at 525 (citing W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d
27 (1929)).
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"sale," when used in a property context, is commonly understood to mean
any conveyance of an estate for money or money's worth regardless of the
duration or quantity of the property interest conveyed. 49 Thus the term
encompasses transfers of fee simple interests, a determinable fee, a fee sub-
ject to a condition subsequent, and life estates.50 Because a common oil
and gas lease creates a determinable fee, the court held that the lease in
this case constituted a sale giving rise to Cherokee's preferential right to
purchase.5
Deceptive Trade Practices and Warranties of Fitness. During the survey
period the Texas Supreme Court decided two significant cases involving
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.5 2 The first case, G- W-L, Inc. v.
Robichaux,5 3 was a suit by the purchaser of a new home against its
builder-seller for breach of the implied warranty of fitness. The Texas
Supreme Court first recognized the implied warranty of fitness in 1968 in
Humber v. Morton 4 The implied warranty requires that a house be con-
structed in a good and workmanlike manner and therefore be suitable for
human habitation. 55 The parties in Robichaux agreed that the implied
warranty of fitness applied to their transaction unless certain language in
the buyer's purchase money note was sufficient to waive the warranty. The
court therefore considered whether a certain provision in the note con-
tained sufficient language to waive the warranty.56 Noting that this ques-
tion was one of first impression, the supreme court agreed with the court of
appeals that language waiving an implied warranty must be clear and free
from doubt.57 The supreme court, however, overruled the appellate
court's determination that the language of disclaimer was insufficient.58
The note in question provided:
This note, the aforesaid Mechanic's and Materialmen's Lien Contract
and the plans and specification signed for identification by the parties
hereto constitute the entire agreement between the parties hereto with
reference to the erection of said improvements, there being no oral
agreements, representations, conditions, warranties, express or im-
49. 641 S.W.2d at 525.
50. Id.
51. Id The court stated that the term "lease," when used in an oil and gas context, is a
misnomer. The lease creates a determinable fee, which is an interest in land. Id The court
in Cherokee held that evidence that the mineral owners had executed a number of oil and
gas leases during the 30-year period following the conveyance to Cherokee and that produc-
tion eventually occurred was extrinsic evidence that the trial court had improperly consid-
ered. Id The deed itself was unambiguous and parol evidence was therefore inadmissible.
Id The deed expressly provided, moreover, that failure to exercise the option on one sale
would not be a waiver of Cherokee's right with respect to subsequent sales.
52. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
53. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
54. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
55. Id at 559.
56. 643 S.W.2d at 393.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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plied, in addition to said written instruments. 9
The supreme court stated that this language could not be clearer and that
parties have an obligation to protect themselves by reading what they
sign. 60 The court therefore held that the purchaser had waived the implied
warranty of fitness upon signing the note.6 1
The other noteworthy case concerning the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act is Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc. ,62 in which the second owner of a home
sued the builder for defects that he alleged constituted a breach of the
implied warranty of fitness. Like Robichaux, Gupta involved a question of
first impression, which was whether the implied warranty of fitness extends
to subsequent purchasers.63 The supreme court held that the implied war-
ranty does protect subsequent purchasers with respect to latent defects not
discoverable by a reasonably prudent inspection of the building at the time
of sale.64 The court's rationale was essentially that the builder has a duty
to construct defect-free buildings and that the relative knowledge and abil-
ity of builder and consumer compel the extension of this duty to a subse-
quent purchaser.65 Furthermore, the court stated, a latent defect is just as
harmful to a subsequent owner as it is to the original buyer, and the
builder is no more able to justify inadequate work to a subsequent owner
than to the original buyer.66 The defendant argued that an implied war-
ranty of fitness should not extend to a subsequent purchaser because of the
lack of privity. The court held, however, that the implied warranty of
fitness is implicit in the contract between the builder and original pur-
chaser and is automatically assigned to a subsequent purchaser. 67 The de-
fendant cited Cheney v. Parks68 and Thornton Homes, Inc. v. Greiner69 for
the proposition that the implied warranty of fitness does not apply to sales
of used homes. The court distinguished Cheney, noting that the suit in that
59. Id.
60. Id
61. Id. The plaintiff also argued that TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Vernon
1968 & Supp. 1984), concerning exclusion and modification of warranties, applies to an
implied warranty of fitness and that therefore the disclaimer of warranties in the note should
have been conspicuous. The supreme court held, however, that § 2.316 does not apply to the
construction and sale of a house because the Texas Uniform Commercial Code is limited to
the sale of "goods," which are defined to be "all things ... that are movable .... 643
S.W.2d at 394 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.105 (Vernon 1968)).
62. 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983).
63. Id. at 169.
64. Id.
65. The Gupta court stated:
The reasons for this holding are: (1) a builder should be in business to con-
struct buildings free of latent defects; (2) the buyer cannot, by reasonable in-
spection or examination, discern such defects; (3) the buyer cannot normally
rely on his own judgment in such matters; (4) in view of the circumstances and
the relations of the parties, the buyer is deemed to have relied on the builder;
and (5) the builder is the only one who has or could have had knowledge of
the manner in which the building was built.
Id
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 605 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
69. 619 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ refed n.r.e.).
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case was against a prior owner who was not the builder.7° The mere fact
that a house is used, while it does not create an implied warranty of habita-
bility on the part of the nonbuilder owner, does not limit the liability of a
builder.71 The court specifically disapproved the holding in Thornton
Homes that purchasers are not entitled to recover against a builder for
breach of an implied warranty of habitability when the home is used.72
II. TITLE AND OWNERSHIP
Legal Descriptions. Two significant court of appeals decisions dealt with
descriptions in plats and deeds during the survey period. 73 The lot owners
in Baskin v. Jeffers74 brought suit for a permanent injunction to prohibit
Baskin, a developer, from building townhouses in violation of restrictive
covenants limiting construction on the "lots" within a particular subdivi-
sion to single family residences. 75 It was undisputed that Baskin knew of
the restrictive covenants.
The lot owners argued that the disputed acreage was a lot as designated
on the plat and therefore was burdened with the recorded restrictions. The
subdivision itself contained seventeen blocks, each of which contained one
or more lots. The plat indicated the location of lots and blocks by solid
boundary lines and a block and lot numbering system. The plat also
showed the areas designated for streets, parks, and other easements. In
addition to these areas, several parcels of raw acreage bounded by broken
lines on the plat were not designated for a particular use and were not
numbered like the lots. Baskin proposed to develop this raw acreage.
In determining whether the disputed acreage was subject to the restric-
tive covenants, the court first had to decide whether the acreage was a lot,
since only lots were burdened by the restrictions. 76 The court stated that
the term "lot" could have a variety of meanings depending upon the facts
and circumstances surroundings its use.77 In the context of a subdivision
depicted in a recorded plat, however, the court held that a lot can only
mean a fractional part of a block as defined by the fixed boundaries on an
approved and recorded plat.78 In the instant case the disputed acreage did
not meet the definition of a lot because it was not sufficiently marked or
70. 646 S.W.2d at 169.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Thornton Homes, 619 S.W.2d at 9). Justice Spears, joined by Justice Ray,
concurred in the holding and the opinion of the majority in Gupta. Id. at 170. Justice
Spears warned that, in creating this new cause of action in Texas, liability should be limited
to latent defects that manifest themselves after the purchase and are not discoverable by a
subsequent purchaser's reasonably prudent inspection at the time of sale. Id.
73. In addition, the supreme court dealt with the sufficiency of legal descriptions in
Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1982) (agreement to con-
vey mineral leasehold interests in future). See infra note 147.
74. 653 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
75. The restrictive covenants provided that "[no lots shall be used except for single
family residential purposes." Id. at 481.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 482.
78. Id. (citing Wall v. Ayrshire Corp., 352 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
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designated for a particular use on the plat.7 9 Consequently, the acreage
was not burdened by the covenants. 80
The Houston court of appeals reviewed the sufficiency of a property
description in a deed in Teledyne Isotopes, Inc. v. Bravenec. 81 A dispute
arose because of the sketchy legal description, and Bravenec sued to re-
move a cloud on title. The deed described the property conveyed as "100
acres of land and being out of the South east comer of a tract of land
containing 300 acres more or less."'82 The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Bravenec on the ground that the description was
insufficient.
Teledyne argued that the deed adequately described the property when
supplemented with extrinsic evidence. 83 The court of appeals rejected
Teledyne's argument, stating that although a deed will not be declared
void if the property's location can be ascertained, the deed by itself or by
reference to an existing writing must identify the property with reasonable
certainty. 84 Extrinsic evidence may be used only to aid the certainty of the
description by explaining the descriptive words, not to supply the location
and description of the property conveyed. 85 The deed in this case con-
1961, no writ) (brokerage agreement did not include property not defined by fixed bounda-
ries on plat)).
79. 653 S.W.2d at 482. To constitute a dedication the plat must clearly indicate an
intent to designate the property for a particular use, not merely for a projected future use.
Ives v. Karnes, 452 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1970, no writ); City of
Dallas v. Crow, 326 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref d n.r.e.). Dotted
boundary lines evidence a prospective intent to dedicate the area. Crow, 326 S.W.2d at 196.
80. 653 S.W.2d at 482. The lot owners also argued that the area should be burdened by
the restrictions even if it did not constitute a lot, since it fell within the subdivision tract.
The court found, however, that all the building restrictions specifically referred to lots and
were not of a type that would apply to land not characterized as lots. Id at 483.
81. 640 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. Id. at 389.
83. Appellants argued that reference to the original deed and an area survey would be
adequate to locate the tract.
84. 640 S.W.2d at 389-90. The Texas statute of conveyances requires an adequate legal
description. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.021 (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1288 (Vernon 1980)); Teledyne, 640 S.W.2d at 390 (citing Wilson
v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 56, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1945) (written agreement must express
essential terms with such certainty that intention of parties may be determined without re-
course to parol evidence); Osborne v. Moore, 112 Tex. 361, 363, 247 S.W. 498, 499 (1923)
(written agreement must contain essential terms of contract, expressed with such certainty
that intention of parties can be determined without recourse to parol evidence); Morrison v.
Dailey, 6 S.W. 426, 427 (Tex. 1887) (writing must be sufficient to identify property and
contract, but not all terms of agreement must be included)). The authorities the court cited
concerned requirements under the statute of frauds and not under the statute of convey-
ances. Generally, the detail required in formation of a contract is not as great as that re-
quired to support a link in the chain of legal title. Spires v. Price, 159 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1942, writ refd w.o.m.). For a discussion of the amount of descriptive
detail necessary in a deed, see W.T. Carter & Bro. v. Ewers, 133 Tex. 616, 131 S.W.2d 86
(1939). See also infra note 147 and accompanying text.
85. 640 S.W.2d at 390; see also Kuklies v. Reinert, 256 S.W.2d 435, 442-43 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1953, writ refd n.r.e.) (if description is sufficient to enable party familiar with
locality to identify premises intended to be conveyed, to exclusion of other premises,
description is sufficient). But cf. Skinner v. Noland, 154 Tex. 615, 617, 281 S.W.2d 332, 333
(1955) (deed contained language that, when supplemented by parol evidence, was sufficient
to locate property).
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tained only two terms that could be construed as part of a description-the
size, "100 acres," and an indefinite location, "out of the South east corner
of a tract of land containing 300 acres." It provided no means of determin-
ing the shape or limits of the 100-acre tract. Consequently, the deed failed
because the location of the property could not be ascertained. 86
The court also rejected Teledyne's argument that the suit was barred by
laches.87 Because laches is an equitable defense, the defendant raising it
must show both that it would be inequitable to allow the plaintiff to pursue
his action because of a change of position by the defendant in reliance on
the plaintiffs in action and that the defendant cannot be restored to its
prior state. 88 As long as parties remain in their initial condition, little sig-
nificance attaches to the extent of the delay. A cloud on title is a continu-
ing injury and is never barred by laches unless the party raising the
defense first shows that, unlike Teledyne, it is in possession of the disputed
property.89 Further, the duty to sue to clear title does not arise until an-
other claim to the property is made. 90 In this case Bravenec timely
brought suit when the adverse claim became apparent from the placement
of an oil rig on the property.91
Covenants and Easements. Two Texas Supreme Court cases reviewed the
requirements for enforcement of covenants and easements. In Frey v.
DeCordova Bend Estates Owners Ass'n 92 the court examined the authority
of a subdivision owners association to assess from its members certain fees.
The association attempted to assess and collect fees for the issuance of
permits to build, transfer ownership, or lease property within the subdivi-
sion. The primary question presented to the court was whether the assess-
ments exceeded the authority of the association. 93 The deed covenants
granting the association the right to assess fees limited such authority to
uniform assessments, but the disputed fees did not apply uniformly to all
landowners. Consequently, the court held the fees invalid because the as-
sociation did not have the authority to levy that type of fee.94
In Carrithers v. Terramar Beach Community Improvement Ass'n95 the
86. 640 S.W.2d at 390. Where a portion of a larger tract is conveyed, however, descrip-
tions that designate the acreage and locate it on one side or in one corner of the larger tract
have been held sufficient. McDonald v. Denson, 199 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1947, writ refd n.r.e.).
87. 640 S.W.2d at 390.
88. Id.
89. Id at 391.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 390. Laches is delay that works an injury on the opposing party. San Antonio
River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266, 277 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (citing City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1964)).
92. 647 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1983).
93. Id. at 247. A second issue of whether Frey had demonstrated the type of injury that
would allow the issuance of an injunction was examined. Id. Since the plaintiff had not
sold, built upon, or leased his lot, he failed to show an actual, irreparable injury that would
warrant injunctive relief. Id. at 248.
94. Id.
95. 645 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1983).
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supreme court addressed the question of whether an easement across sub-
merged land, lying under a turning basin in navigable waters, was enforce-
able. The turning basin in question is on Galveston Island and is part of a
navigable body of water with access to the Gulf of Mexico. The basin was
artificially submerged by a corporation that conveyed the property to its
trustee in bankruptcy, who in turn transferred it to the parties' common
source of title, 7500 Bellaire Corporation. Bellaire granted Terramar's
predecessor in title an exclusive easement for the use of the turning basin
and the waters under which it lay. Bellaire granted Carrithers and
Coulton an interest in the property, subject to the easement. After Bellaire
had transferred its remaining interest to the State of Texas, Carrithers and
Coulton obtained a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to construct
a marina in the basin. Plaintiff obtained an injunction prohibiting the con-
struction of the marina due to its interference with the easement. The
supreme court dissolved that injunction, stating that navigable waters are
held by the state in trust for the public,96 subject only to the federal gov-
ernment's right to exercise control.97 The court held that the easement was
invalid because a grantor cannot convey more than he owns.98 Neither
may an easement be created that violates either public policy or a statute. 99
Because the right to control navigable waters belongs exclusively to the
State of Texas and the United States, the supreme court ruled that the
easement would contravene the sovereignty of the state and federal gov-
ernments.I °° The court therefore held the easement invalid and the ma-
rina's construction subject only to proper governmental authorization.' 10
Cotenants. In Williams v. Shamburger,0 2 Williams, the owner of a one-
tenth interest in farmland as a tenant in common, sued to partition the
property and recover funds he had expended for maintenance, taxes, and
96. Id. at 774 (citing Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 111, 286 S.W. 458, 473 (1926). The
water, shores, and beds of the Gulf of Mexico, within the gulfward boundary as determined
in Texas v. Louisiana, 426 U.S. 465 (1976), are owned by the State of Texas, subject to
certain federal powers. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 11.012(a) (Vernon 1978). Texas holds
these waters in trust for the public with a specific order of preferential uses. Motl v. Boyd,
116 Tex. 82, 111, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926) (preferred uses are, first, navigation; second,
riparian owners; third, best interest of all nonriparians; fourth, other uses); see also W.
HUTCHINS, THE TEXAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 77 (1961) (discussing interest of riparian
owners in corpus of water as it flows in stream).
97. 645 S.W.2d at 774. Texas's rights are subject to the federal government's commerce
clause power to control navigable waters, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, and its admirality and
maritime jurisdiction, id art. Ii, § 2. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 11.012(b) (Vernon
1978).
98. 645 S.W.2d at 774 (citing Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 202
(Tex. 1962)).
99. 645 S.W.2d at 774. Texas courts follow the general rule that an agreement in con-
travention of a valid statute is void and unenforceable. Woolsey v. Panhandle Ref. Co., 131
Tex. 449, 455, 116 S.W.2d 675, 678 (1938).
100. 645 S.W.2d at 774.
101. Id.
102. 638 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ refd n.r.e.). The suit originated from
the decision in Williams v. Williams, 559 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that property was owned in cotenancy).
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improvements to the property. The trial court found that the property
could not be partitioned in kind, and so it ordered the property sold and
the proceeds distributed equally among the cotenants. The court rejected
Williams's claim for reimbursement.
The Waco court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, de-
termining that the claimed expenditures had been fully offset by the bene-
fits Williams had derived from the use of the property. 10 3 Cotenants are
obligated to share any income from the property and may also recover
from their cotenants their share of expenses necessary for the preservation
of the property. °4 The rule differs, however, with regard to improve-
ments. If a cotenant incurs expenses to improve the property without first
obtaining the consent of the other cotenants, then he may only recover the
amount of the increase in the value of the property attributable to the im-
provements. 10 5 Applying these rules to the case at bar, the Texas Supreme
Court found that Williams had not indicated the amount of the expenses
that were incurred for the preservation of the property, nor did Williams
overcome evidence showing that he had retained all the benefits from the
property for twenty-five years. 10 6 The supreme court therefore held that
any claim for reimbursement that Williams might have had was fully offset
by the benefits he retained. 10 7
Nuisance. In McAshan v. River Oaks Country Club 108 the Houston court of
appeals was asked to find that a country club's construction of a parking
lot next to McAshan's home would constitute a nuisance per se, warranting
issuance of an injunction. The plaintiff testified that automobile lights and
noise interfered with his sleep and that liquor bottles were strewn through-
out the parking lot area. The court held such evidence insufficient to es-
tablish that the lot constituted a nuisance per se, in light of other evidence
that the directors of the country club could restrict the time and manner of
the lot's use. 109 An injunction is improper for the mere prospect of an
injury or annoyance in the future, and absent proof that the lot would be a
nuisance per se the court denied the injunction. 10
103. 638 S.W.2d at 641.
104. Id. at 640 (citing Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 552 S.W.2d 175, 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (duty to preserve common property rests on all co-
owners and he who expends more than his share may recover a pro rata share of expenses
from other cotenants); Wooley v. West, 391 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965,
writ refd n.r.e.) (supporting same proposition)).
105. 638 S.W.2d at 640-41 (citing Burton v. Williams, 195 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1946, no writ)). The law will not cause a nonconsenting cotenant to pay a pro rata
share of the costs of improvements. Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1965). A
cotenant that has improved property may recover only increase in the value of that property.
Id. at 202 (where improvement is designed to enhance mineral production, increase in value
cannot be determined until mineral production has begun).
106. 638 S.W.2d at 640.
107. Id. at 641.
108. 646 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
109. Id. at 518.
110. Id. at 518-19 (citing Schulman v. City of Houston, 406 S.W.2d 219, 225 (Tex. Civ.
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Rule Against Perpetuities. In Peveto v. Starkey"' the Texas Supreme
Court held that a top deed, conditioned upon the reversion of a determina-
ble fee, violated the rule against perpetuities."12 The top deed was exe-
cuted four months prior to the expiration of the primary term of an earlier
royalty deed." 13 The rule against perpetuities is applied as of the time of
the initial conveyance.' 14 In this case the possibility arose that the interest
might not vest within the limits of the rules since that interest was subject
to the first deed, which contained the normal secondary-term language
that could allow an interest to continue indefinitely.' 's The court held the
deed void because the interest could not vest until the reversion of the
determinable fee, which might not occur until beyond the period of the
rule. 116
Zoning. In Texans to Save the Capitol, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment" 7 the
plaintiffs challenged the issuance of a building permit that they contended
violated a zoning ordinance."18 The ordinance allowed buildings in down-
town Austin to exceed a 200-foot height limitation by three feet for every
one foot the buildings were set back from the street line. The controversy
centered around the definition of the term "setback" as embodied in the
zoning ordinance.' '9 Plaintiffs alleged that there could be only one set-
back per building. The City of Austin had accepted the administering
App.-Tyler 1966, writ refd n.r.e.) (injunctive relief improper when complained-of conduct
may or may not become a nuisance)).
111. 645 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1982).
112. Id. at 772. The rule against perpetuities is embodied in the Texas Constitution as
against the "genius of a free government." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26. The rule renders any
interest invalid "which by any possibility may not become vested within a life or lives in
being ... and twenty-one years thereafter ..... Foshee v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 617
S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1981).
113. 645 S.W.2d at 771. The clause that gave rise to the dispute provided, "This grant
shall become effective only on the expiration of the above described Royalty Deed to R.L.
Peveyto [sic] dated April 23, 1960." Id.
114. Id. at 772 (citing Brooker v. Brooker, 130 Tex. 27, 38-39, 106 S.W.2d 247, 254
(1937)).
115. 645 S.W.2d at 772. As long as oil and gas was produced in paying quantities
Peveto's interest would continue indefinitely. Thus Peveto's interest met the definition of a
determinable fee, which is " 'an interest which may continue forever, but the estate is liable
to be determined, without the aid of a conveyance, by some act or event circumscribing its
continuance or extent.'" Id (quoting Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113
Tex. 160, 173, 254 S.W. 290, 295 (1923)).
116. 645 S.W.2d at 772.
117. 647 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Texans to Save the
Capitol, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation concerned with protecting the view of the capitol in
the downtown Austin area.
118. The court first addressed the issue of whether the corporation had standing to bring
the suit. The court found that plaintiff had standing. Id. (citing Austin Neighborhoods
Council, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 644 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (plaintiff must show damage or injury other than as a member of general public)).
119. Austin City Code § 13-2-130(a)(1). The ordinance allowed buildings to be con-
structed three feet above the maximum 200-foot limit for each foot of "setback" from the
streetline. Texans to Save the Capitol, Inc., disputed a city agency's interpretation that the
setback could occur anywhere in the first 200 feet of height, allowing a wedding cake-shaped
building to be constructed above the maximum height even though no setback existed at the
street level.
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agency's interpretation that the ordinance allowed more than one setback
per building. The Austin court of appeals found that the meaning of "set-
back" as embodied in the ordinance was ambiguous.120 The court af-
forded deferential treatment to the construction placed on the ordinance
by the administering agency,' 2 ' since that interpretation was reasonable
and had been applied for nearly fifty years.' 22 The court therefore held
that issuance of the permit in accordance with the agency's interpretation
of the ordinance was not an abuse of discretion. 123
Constructive Trusts. The San Antonio court of appeals imposed a con-
structive trust on profits made by one joint venturer after the termination
of the joint venture in Sanchez v. Matthews.124 Sanchez, Matthews, and
one other person had formed a joint venture for the purpose of holding for
resale a certain piece of real property in Bexar County. The venture was to
terminate either upon the sale of the property or July 1, 1971, whichever
occurred first. If the property was not sold by July 1, 1971, efforts would
be made to sell the property at a price sufficient to recoup the money in-
vested in the acreage.
The property was not sold by July 1, 1971. The joint venturers agreed
on July 12 to offer the property at a price adequate to recover their costs
and expenses. On July 19 Sanchez, acting for the venture, entered into a
sales contract with Berger. 125 On August 2 Sanchez agreed with Berger
and a third party to repurchase Sanchez's fifty percent interest in the prop-
erty following transfer of the property to Berger. On August 9 the joint
venture conveyed the property to Berger. On August 10 Berger conveyed
an undivided fifty percent interest in the acreage to Sanchez and a twenty-
five percent interest to Toland. Sanchez did not record his deed until Feb-
ruary 22, 1972. He later conveyed a twenty-five percent interest to Benson.
The evidence showed that prior to the sale to Berger, Sanchez had dis-
cussed the property with Toland. The property was sold in November
1973 for a substantial profit, of which Sanchez's share amounted to
$153,728. Matthews sued to recover twenty-five percent of Sanchez's prof-
its, representing the portion attributable to Matthews's interest in the origi-
nal venture.
The trial court imposed a constructive trust on Matthews's share of
Sanchez's profits. The court of appeals agreed that Sanchez had profited
from the fiduciary relationship and affirmed the imposition of the con-
120. 647 S.W.2d at 775.
121. Id (citing Calvert v. Kane, 427 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1968); Slocomb v. Cameron In-
dep. School Dist., 116 Tex. 288, 288 S.W. 1064 (Tex. 1926); State v. Aransas Dock & Chan-
nel Co., 365 S.W.2d 220 (Tex, Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ ref'd)).
122. 647 S.W.2d at 776. The evidence indicated that the agency's interpretation was first
formulated shortly after the ordinance's adoption in 193 I, more than fifty years prior to this
case, and had governed the building of several of Austin's historic landmarks. Id at 776 n.6.
123. Id at 777-78.
124. 636 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
125. The contract was a fifteen-day earnest money contract.
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structive trust.126 The court determined that the fiduciary relationship had
existed at the time the plan to obtain an interest in the property was formu-
lated, so that the plan fell within the scope of the original venture. 27 Con-
sequently, the profits belonged to the venture, and the trial court had
properly placed a constructive trust upon those proceeds of the sale that
corresponded to Matthews's ownership interest in the original venture. 128
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Texas law,
reached a different result in deciding when a constructive trust should be
imposed. In Harris v. Sentry Title Co. 129 Ward wanted to obtain a parcel
of property owned by the Tarrant County Water Control Board. Ward
did not want his name known for fear it would drive up the price of the
property.' 3 0 Ward therefore contacted Whatley and reached an agreement
that Ward would submit bids through either Whatley or an affiliate of
Whatley. 131 The water control board rejected the first round of bids. 132
Ward and Whatley then devised a strategy to acquire the property that
included purchasing a second parcel of property, which was the property
in dispute, because such parcel carried an easement over the target prop-
erty. The disputed property was acquired by Home Engineering, Inc., a
Whatley company, for $30,500, with Ward furnishing the down payment.
Home Engineering later transferred the property to Sentry Title Company,
another Whatley corporation.
Ward eventually concluded that the target parcel was overpriced and
discontinued bidding. He then demanded title to the disputed property,
claiming beneficial ownership. Whatley refused to convey the property to
Ward. The district court held that the oral agreement to convey the prop-
erty to Ward was unenforceable because it violated the statute of frauds. 133
The court imposed a constructive trust, however, on the proceeds from a
foreclosure sale of the property. 134 No party raised the issue of a resulting
trust. 13 The circuit court reversed, holding that failure to comply with the
126. 636 S.W.2d at 458. The court recognized that persons in a joint venture have a
fiduciary relationship in many instances. Id. (citing 5 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 495
(3d ed. 1967)).
127. 636 S.W.2d at 459 (citing Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977)). The
court also noted that recent decisions of the Texas Supreme Court had limited the scope of
joint ventures for the purpose of imposing a constructive trust. 636 S.W.2d at 459 (citing
Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976) (constructive trust was proper because
fiduciary relationship existed and second deal was within scope of original venture)).
128. 636 S.W.2d at 460.
129. 715 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1983).
130. Travis Ward is a successful business and oil man in Athens, Texas.
131. Whatley's affiliate was Hart, who was to receive $30,000 to $35,000 if the bid was
successful.
132. The trial court determined that three bids had actually been made on behalf of
Ward. Hart made a bid to purchase the property. Pan American Properties, Inc., Ward's
holding company, submitted a bid. Home Engineering, Inc., one of Whatley's companies,
made a bid. Ward had hoped that one of the three bids would be the high bid, and that it
could then be withdrawn with one of the other Ward-related bids winning the 490 acres.
133. 715 F.2d at 944.
134. Id. The significance of a constructive trust in this case is that such trusts, although
involving real property, are not subject to the statute of frauds. Id. at 945.
135. Id. at 946. A resulting trust arises when A provides purchase money to B so that B
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statute of frauds barred Ward's enforcement of the oral agreement. The
court also determined that the evidence did not establish the necessary ele-
ments of a constructive trust. 136
The court stated that in order to achieve a constructive trust under Texas
law a party must show (1) a prior fiduciary relationship with the other
party other than the transaction at hand and (2) that the party against
whom the trust would be imposed would otherwise be unjustly en-
riched. 37 The court found that a fiduciary relationship existed, but the
first element was still not satisfied because the relationship was neither
longstanding nor unrelated to the disputed transaction. 138 The court also
determined that it was not inequitable for Whatley to retain the large prof-
its he had realized. 139 The court further stated that Ward could have
avoided this result had he reduced the oral agreement to writing. 140 Be-
cause Ward did not do so his suit was barred by the statute of frauds. 14 1
Consequently, the court allowed Sentry to retain the proceeds of the fore-
closure sale. 142
Notice. In Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp. 143 the plain-
may take legal title in his own name, with 4 remaining the beneficial owner of the property.
The facts of the instant case meet all the requirements of a resulting trust. See Cohrs v.
Scott, 161 Tex. 111, 117, 338 S.W.2d 127, 130 (1960) (resulting trust arises by operation of
law when title conveyed to one person but purchase price paid by another); Crume v. Smith,
620 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (same rule); cf. Brelsford v.
Scheltz, 564 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.)
(generally, where express trust fails, resulting trust imposed).
136. 715 F.2d at 950.
137. Id at 947. The court quoted from an earlier Texas Supreme Court decision in
explaining the rationale behind constructive trusts: " '[A person holding title to property is
subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to retain it.' " Id. at 946 (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 150
Tex. 39, 49, 237 S.W.2d 256, 262 (1951); see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
The Sentry court then reviewed the judicial application of this definition. After reviewing
Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977); Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. v. Thomp-
son, 405 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1966); and Panama-Williams, Inc. v. Lipsey, 576 S.W.2d 426
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ), the Sentry court concluded that two
elements were necessary to establish a constructive trust, a prior unrelated fiduciary relation-
ship and unjust enrichment. 715 F.2d at 946-48.
138. Id. at 948. Whether or not a fiduciary relationship exists is a question of fact, but
whether or not a relationship is sufficiently longstanding to warrant imposition of a con-
structive trust is a matter of law. Id. (citing Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 150 Tex. 39, 51, 237 S.W.2d
256, 263 (1951)). The court ruled as a matter of law that the relationship was not sufficiently
longstanding. 715 F.2d at 948.
139. Id. at 949-50. The transaction was not found to be the result of mistake, duress, or
fraud. Ward had made an intentional business decision to enter into the transaction. 1d.
140. Id. at 950. The court also intimated that Ward did not have clean hands due to his
dealings and could not seek equitable relief in any event. The court misapplied this concept,
however, since the party asserting unclean hands as a defense must have been harmed by the
unclean act. Omohundro v. Matthews, 341 S.W.2d 401, 410 (Tex. 1960). The circuit court
did not find that the unclean act harmed Whatley.
141. 715 F.2d at 945.
142. Id. at 950-51. The dissent makes a compelling argument that even under the major-
ity's analysis there was sufficient evidence to support the imposition of a constructive trust
by the trial court. Id at 951-61 (Will, J., dissenting).
143. 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982).
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tiffs sought to enforce an area of mutual interest agreement' 44 signed by
Gulf's predecessor in title, Chambers & Kennedy. On August 4, 1966, Mo-
bil had entered into a farmout agreement with Westland. Chambers &
Kennedy desired to take over Westland's obligations under the farmout
agreement. Chambers & Kennedy entered into an unrecorded letter
agreement with Westland that outlined the purchase provisions. 45 In ad-
dition to other terms, the agreement included an area of mutual interest
agreement.146 Thereafter, Gulf purchased Chambers & Kennedy's interest
in the property.
The mutual interest agreement became the focus of the lawsuit. 147 The
primary question was whether Gulf took the property without notice of
Westland's equitable claim. The Texas Supreme Court followed the set-
tled rule that " 'a purchaser is bound by every recital, reference and reser-
vation contained in or fairly disclosed by any instrument which forms an
essential link in the chain of title under which he claims.' "'48 The court
144. An area of mutual agreement is one by which parties describe a certain geographic
area within which they agree to share any additional leasehold interests that are obtained by
one of the parties. Id. at 905.
145. The agreement provided that Chambers & Kennedy would assume all of the obliga-
tions of the Mobil/Westland farmout agreement, pay Westland $50,000 in cash, assign
Westland a '/[6 of l/s overriding royalty on any acreage earned from Mobil, /32 of the working
interest obtained from Mobil under the farmout agreement, and a production payment of
$150,000 from the test well.
146. It was the area of mutual interest agreement, contained in the letter agreement of
November 15, 1966, that Westland sought to enforce against Gulf. The mutual interest
agreement provided:
5. If any of the parties hereto, their representatives or assigns, acquire any
additional leasehold interests affecting any of the lands covered by said
farmout agreement, or any additional interest from Mobil Oil Corporation
under lands in the area of the farmout acreage, such shall be subject to the
terms and provisions of this agreement ....
637 S.W.2d at 905 (emphasis added).
147. Since the agreement called for the conveyance of oil and gas lease interests, the
statute of frauds, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1984) had to
be satisfied. 637 S.W.2d at 908. Gulf contended that the agreement contained an insuffi-
cient description of the property to allow conveyance.
The letter agreement contained descriptions of two different properties. The first descrip-
tion referred to "any of the lands covered by said farmout agreement." The second descrip-
tion referred to "under lands in the area of the farmout acreage." Id. at 905. Each
description was examined independently. The first description was held to be sufficient be-
cause "such farmout" was a term defined as the Mobil/Westland farmout agreement. The
Mobil/Westland farmout agreement in turn contained an adequate description. Id. at 909.
The second description, however, was found to be inadequate. Westland's attempt to
supplement the description with extrinsic evidence was rejected. Extrinsic evidence is
proper only to clarify the written description and not provide the actual location or descrip-
tion of the property. 1d. at 909-10 (citing Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 57, 188 S.W.2d 150,
152 (1945)). For further discussion regarding the sufficiency of descriptions contained in
deeds or contracts of sale, see supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
148. 637 S.W.2d at 908 (emphasis supplied by court) (quoting Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil
Co., 250 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ refd)). In support of this
rule the court cited five other cases: Williams v. Harris County Houston Ship Channel Nav-
igation Dist., 128 Tex. 411, 418, 99 S.W.2d 276, 280 (1936) (vendee charged with construc-
tive knowledge of restrictive provisions of deed); Texas Co. v. Dunlap, 41 S.W.2d 42, 44
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, judgmt adopted) (cited for same proposition); Guevara v.
Guevara, 280 S.W. 736, 737 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, judgmt adopted) (same rule); Tuggle
v. Cooke, 277 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1955, writ refd n.r.e.) (vendee
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held that this rule applies regardless of whether the document is recorded
or affects the chain of title.' 49
In the instant case, the property was conveyed subject to an operating
agreement that referred to the letter agreement. It was the duty of the
purchaser to investigate the operating agreement.' 50 Consequently, Gulf
was placed on notice not only of the operating agreement but also of any
interest arising from a document listed in the contents of the operating
agreement.' 51 Gulf therefore took the property subject to Westland's equi-
table claim. 15 2
Homestead-Foreclosure of Federal Tax Lien. In United States v. Rod-
gers ' 53 the United States Supreme Court in effect added a fourth exception
to the provision of the Texas Constitution that protects homesteads from
charged with constructive notice that portion of mineral rights had been previously alien-
ated); Abercrombie v. Bright, 271 S.W.2d 734, 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1954, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (same rule).
149. 637 S.W.2d at 908.
150. Id.
151. Id. The dissent distinguished the cases cited by the majority on the basis that in
those cases the instrument referred to in the deed affected the purchaser's title, while in the
present case the purchaser's title was not affected. Id at 913-14 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
There are two types of notice according to the dissent, actual and constructive. Id at 911.
Problems arise when courts use the terms interchangeably to mean the same thing. Id This
case did not involve constructive notice because such notice is implied by law from properly
recorded instruments. Id. The letter agreement was not recorded. Consequently, the ques-
tion was whether or not Gulf had actual notice of Westland's equitable claim. Gulf did not
have express knowledge of the claim; therefore, any actual notice would have to be implied.
d. at 912. Implied notice is the result of an inference of fact that would cause a prudent
person to investigate. Gulf should be charged with implied actual notice of any facts that a
reasonably prudent person could have ascertained. Id (citing Exxon v. Raetzer, 553 S.W.2d
842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
The dissent then determined the extent of the duty to investigate. In Flack v. First Nat'l
Bank, 148 Tex. 495, 226 S.W.2d 628 (1958), the court limited the duty to matters suggested
by the facts really known. Id. at 497, 226 S.W.2d at 631. Each case cited by the majority
involved documents that affected title. 637 S.W.2d at 913. In each case the instrument
giving rise to the disputed equitable right was referred to in the chain of title. Id. at 913-14
citing Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 250 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ
ref'd) (deed contained in chain of title referred to unrecorded prior contract); Williams v.
Harris County Houston Navigation Dist., 128 Tex. 411, 99 S.W.2d 276 (1936) (purchaser's
deed referred to another deed within chain of title containing restrictive covenants) Texas
Co. v. Dunlap, 41 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, judgmt adopted) (deed within chain
of title reserved a vendor's lien); Guevara v. Guevara, 280 S.W. 736 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1926, judgmt adopted) (deed recital recognized existence of purchase money note and ven-
dor's lien); Tuggle v. Cooke, 277 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1955, writ refd
n.r.e.) (deed in chain of title referred to another deed containing restrictive provisions); Ab-
ercrombie v. Bright, 271 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (deed
in chain of title recognized prior conveyance of certain interest); Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S.W.
305 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1913, writ refd) (purchaser bound by recital in original deed
from grantor town); W.T. Carter & Bro. v. Davis, 88 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1935, writ dism'd) (both recorded deeds in chain of title)). The dissent would not have
charged Gulf with knowledge of a document referred to in the operating agreement as a
matter of law. 637 S.W.2d at 913. The dissent would have required a factual determination
as to whether or not Gulf had notice of Westland's equitable claim. Id at 914.
152. Id. at 908.
153. 103 S. Ct. 2132, 76 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1983).
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forced sale. 154 The Court ruled that any property in which a delinquent
taxpayer owns an interest is subject to forced sale under section 7403 of the
Internal Revenue Code.' 55 The Court noted that the Texas homestead
provisions vest in each spouse an interest similar to an undivided life es-
tate. 156 The Court nevertheless subjected the homestead of a Texas widow
to forced sale to satisfy the separate tax liability of her late husband.
1 57
This decision rejected the Fifth Circuit's determination that only the inter-
est in the property owned by the delinquent taxpayer, and not the entire
jointly owned property, was subject to sale.' 58 The Court reasoned that
the clear wording of section 7403 favored this construction because that
section specifically refers to "any property, [of] whatever nature, of the
delinquent, or in which he has any right, title or interest." ' 159 In addition,
the Court noted that the statute requires that all persons having an interest
in the property be made parties to the proceeding,' 60 and that it further
requires the district court to determine the interests of the parties in and to
the property. 161
While this ruling may appear harsh, the Court recognized that section
7403 vests the district court with discretion in deciding whether to order a
sale and noted that the district court must review equitable considerations
because "financial compensation may not always be a completely ade-
quate substitute for a roof over one's head." 162 The full impact of Rodgers
154. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 provides that a homestead is protected from forced sale
for the payment of debts "except for the purchase money thereof, or a part of such purchase
money, the taxes due thereon, or for work and material used in constructing improvements
thereon."
155. 103 S. Ct. at 2142-43, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 253. Section 7403 provides that the govern-
ment may "subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has
any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability." I.R.C. § 7403 (1982).
Justice Brennan stated in the majority opinion that the supremacy clause, U.S. CoNsT. art.
V1, cl. 2, "provides the underpinning for the Federal Government's right to sweep aside
state-created exemptions .... ." 103 S. Ct. at 2147, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 258.
156. Id. at 2139, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 248.
157. Id. at 2152, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 265. The case consolidated with Rodgers involved the
added elements of how insurance proceeds paid after a fire in the residence should be shared
and whether an abandonment of the homestead had occurred. Id at 2140, 76 L. Ed. 2d at
249-50.
158. United States v. Rogers, 649 F.2d 1117, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1981). The Court agreed
with the appellate court, however, that the government's lien under l.R.C. § 6321 (1982) did
not extend beyond the property interests of the delinquent taxpayer. 103 S. Ct. at 2141, 76
L. Ed. 2d at 251.
159. Id. at 2142, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 252 (brackets in original; emphasis added).
160. See I.R.C. § 7403(b) (1982).
161. 103 S. Ct. at 2142, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 252-53; see I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1982). The Court
noted that any due process claims of third parties arising from the "taking" of this property
were satisfied by § 7403(c), which requires distribution of sale proceeds " 'according to the
findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States.'" 103
S. Ct. at 2145, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 255 (quoting I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1982)).
162. 103 S. Ct. at 2148, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 260. The Court listed the following four factors to
be considered by the district court in deciding whether to order a sale: (1) the extent to
which the government would be prejudiced by a sale of only the delinquent taxpayer's inter-
est in the property; (2) whether the nonliable third party had a legally recognizable expecta-
tion that his separate interest would be subject to forced sale; (3) prejudice to the nonliable
third party; and (4) "the relative character and value of the nonliable and liable interests
held in the property." Id at 2151-52, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 263-64.
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has yet to be realized. It promises to be an important decision, especially
in Texas, where the concept of homestead is almost sanctified. As Mr.
Justice Brennan stated, "The provisions of section 7403 are broad and
profound." 163
Mortgages, Foreclosure, and Notice of Intent to Accelerate. In Ogden v.
Gibraltar Savings Association164 the Texas Supreme Court considered the
question of whether the holder of an installment note containing an op-
tional acceleration provision must, upon default, notify the maker of the
holder's intent to exercise the option. The deed of trust in issue contained
a provision declaring that upon default the balance due on the underlying
note should "at the option of the holder or holders thereof, immediately
become due and payable."'' 65 Upon default, the holder gave notice to the
maker of the note that "failure to cure such breach on or before [a particu-
lar date] may result in acceleration of the sums secured by the Deed of
Trust and sale of the property .... ,,166 The court held this notice to be
insufficient because it only restated the option contained in the deed of
trust. 167
Post-Ogden decisions have focused on waiver of the notice of intent to
accelerate. The Tyler court of appeals in Chapa v. Herbster 168 held that a
waiver of notice in a note or deed of trust dispensed with the requirement
of notice of intent to accelerate. 169 The Fort Worth court of appeals, how-
ever, in Bodf/ord v. Parker,170 held ineffective as a waiver of notice of in-
tent to accelerate, language in a deed of trust providing that "the entire
indebtedness hereby secured .. .may, at the option of the Beneficiary,
...be immediately matured and become due and payable without de-
mand or notice of any character . *.".. ,,7 Two dissenting judges viewed
the quoted language as a clear waiver. 7 2 There seems to be little reason
why an installment debtor cannot waive notice of intent to accelerate and
little doubt that language such as that contained in the Parker deed of trust
would act as such a waiver. 173
163. Id. at 2145, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 256-57.
164. 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982).
165. Id. at 233.
166. Id. (emphasis in original).
167. Id at 234.
168. 653 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
169. Id. at 601.
170. 651 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
171. Id. at 339.
172. Id. at 340-41 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
173. Several intermediate appellate courts besides the Tyler court of appeals, which de-
cided Chapa v. Herbster, have recognized waivers of notice of intent to accelerate. See
Valley v. Patterson, 614 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ); Burnett
v. Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., 593 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ
ref d n.r.e.); Whalen v. Etheridge, 428 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). But see Purnell v. Follett, 555 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1977, no writ) (waiver provision construed only as waiver of formal presentment and
demand, not notice of intent to accelerate).
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Mortgages-Due-on-Sale Clause. The progeny of Sonny Arnold, Inc. v.
Sentry Savings Association 174 continue to give the appellate courts oppor-
tunities to determine whether various due-on-sale clauses are restraints on
alienation. In Sonny Arnold the Texas Supreme Court looked to the Re-
statement of Property definition of restraint on alienation 175 and deter-
mined that the due-on-sale clause at issue was not a restraint on alienation
and was valid and enforceable. 176 The Tyler court of appeals reached the
opposite result in Metropolitan Savings & Loan Association v. Nabours.
17 7
In Nabours the deed of trust provided that any voluntary inter vivos trans-
fer of the property securing the debt without the consent of the lender
would both accelerate the sums due and subject the borrower to a prepay-
ment penalty. 178 The Nabours due-on-sale provision differed from the
Sonny Arnold provision in that it contained both a prepayment penalty
clause and an agreement by the borrower not to convey without the
lender's consent. The Tyler court concluded that the Nabours provision
was a "promissory" restraint on alienation as defined in section 404(l)(b)
of the Restatement of Property 179 and further concluded that the restraint
was unreasonable and therefore void and unenforceable. 180 In reaching
this conclusion the court noted that the Nabours provision gave the lender
free rein to renegotiate the terms of the loan at a time when interest rates
were escalating and mortgage money was in short supply.' 81
174. 633 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1982).
175. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944) states:
(1) A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is used in this Restatement, is
an attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to cause a later
conveyance
(a) to be void; or
(b) to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the later convey-
ance when such liability results from a breach of an agreement not to
convey; or
(c) to terminate or subject to termination all or a part of the property in-
terest conveyed.
(2) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1),
Clause (a), it is a disabling restraint.
(3) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1),
Clause (b), it is a promissory restraint.
(4) If a restraint on alienation is of the type described in Subsection (1),
Clause (c), it is a forfeiture restraint.
176. 633 S.W.2d at 816. The deed of trust provision at issue in Sonny Arnold gave the
lender an option to accelerate but provided that the option would not apply if, prior to the
conveyance, the transferee (who was acceptable to the lender) executed an assumption
agreement, which could include an increase in the interest rate payable under the note. Id.
at 813.
177. 652 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
178. Id at 821.
179. See supra note 175.
180. 652 S.W.2d at 824; see infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text (discussing Garn-
St. Germain Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982), and effect it could have on decisions such as
Nabours).
181. 652 S.W.2d at 823. The due on sale provision at issue in Nabours was also distin-
guished from the provision reviewed in Crestview Ltd. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 816
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which provided for optional acceleration
upon a sale of the mortgaged premises without the approval of the lender but also provided
that such approval would not be unreasonably withheld.
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Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens. During the survey period, Texas ap-
pellate courts decided numerous cases dealing with the liens of mechanics
and materialmen.182 The large amount of judicial resources consumed by
such cases is directly linked to problems with the statutes involved. As
Justice Campbell stated in First National Bank v. Sledge, 83 the mechanics'
and materialmen's lien statutes "are very lengthy, have been subjected to
several revisions, and are not exactly a model of clarity."' 184
The Sledge case is typical of many mechanics' lien cases in that it ad-
dresses issues of both perfection and priority of the lien. The owner of two
lots entered into a mechanic's lien contract with a general contractor for
the construction of a house on each lot. The contractor then assigned the
contract to a bank as collateral for interim construction financing. The
contractor completed one house, but went bankrupt before completing the
other. Five unpaid subcontractors filed lien affidavits and mailed one copy
of each affidavit to the owner. The bank brought suit against the owner
and the subcontractors to quiet its title to the property, or, in the alterna-
tive, for a declaratory judgment that its mechanics' and materialmen's con-
tract lien was superior to the liens of the subcontractors.
The bank contended that the subcontractors' notice to the owner was
deficient because the subcontractors sent only one copy of the lien affida-
vits,' 85 the invoices referred to in the affidavits were not attached, and the
notice did not contain the statutory warning to the owner as to
retainage. 86 In resolving this issue, the court distinguished a lien under
article 5463,187 which it described as a "trapping" statute, from a lien
under article 5469,188 which it described as a "retainage" statute. 189 The
fund for payment of subcontractor claims arising under the former statute
182. The mechanics' lien laws of Texas are codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.001-
.240, 162.001-.033 (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
arts. 5452-5472e (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1982-1983)).
183. 653 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1983).
184. Id at 285-86.
185. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.055 (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) requires that two copies of
the affidavit be delivered to the owner. The court in Sledge did not reach the issue of
whether the sending of one copy of the lien affidavit to the owner was sufficient to perfect a
lien under art. 5463. 653 S.W.2d at 287; cf James Mechanical Contractors v. Tate, 647
S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (mailing of one copy of lien
affidavit to owner held "substantial compliance" with art. 5453). As to liens under TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.101-.105 (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)), see infra note 192.
186. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(c)-(d) (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453, § 2(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) applies to the
notice of debts incurred by a general contractor to be given an owner and requires the lien
claimant to notify the owner that if the debt is not paid, "the owner may be personally liable
and the owner's property may be subjected to a lien unless: (1) the owner withholds pay-
ments from the contractor for the payment of the bill; or (2) the bill is otherwise paid or
settled."
187. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5463, § I (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (current ver-
sion at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.081-.082 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
188. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (current version at
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.101-.105 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
189. 653 S.W.2d at 286.
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is created only upon notice to the owner that subcontractors remain un-
paid. The ten percent retainage under article 5469, however, is statutorily
mandated and requires no third-party action for its creation.
Since the "statutory warning" requirement is a condition precedent to
perfection of a lien under article 5463, the court ruled that the subcontrac-
tors' claims under that statute must fail. 190 Article 5469, however, has dif-
ferent notice requirements, which do not include the statutory warning,
and which were met by the subcontractors.' 91 Thus the court ruled that
the subcontractors had perfected liens under article 5469 and that such
liens, covering ten percent of the value of the work completed, were enti-
tled to a preference over the bank's lien.' 92
The relative priority and scope of a general contractor's mechanics' and
materialmen's lien and a previously recorded deed of trust lien as to re-
movable improvements were decided in L&N Consultants, Inc. v. Sikes. 193
At the time the general contractor substantially completed construction of
thirty-six townhomes, the development company that had employed him
owed him approximately $38,000, of which about $19,700 was for remova-
ble improvements. The total amount of removable improvements in the
project was in excess of $69,000. The noteholder, who had foreclosed on
the project under its deed of trust, claimed that the contractor's lien should
attach to specifically identifiable removable improvements for which the
contractor had not been paid. The noteholder argued that to allow the
contractor's lien to attach to all removable improvements, whether or not
they had previously been paid for, would allow the contractor to use his
lien to recover for nonremovable improvements even though article 5459
gives a priority over superior deed of trust liens only to removable im-
provements. The Dallas court of appeals rejected this argument and held
that article 5452, section 1194 and article 5459, section 1195
do not limit the amount of a contractor's lien to that portion of the
contract price that may be allocated to removables; rather, they give
190. Id. at 287.
191. The court disregarded the failure to provide the owner with two copies of the lien
affidavit as required by art. 5453 on a harmless error rationale. Justice Campbell stated that
the "only apparent purpose for requiring two copies of the lien affidavit be sent to the owner
is so the owner can notify the general contractor that a lien is claimed for a particular unpaid
claim." Id at 287-88. Since the general contractor in question was in bankruptcy, the court
found there was "no harm" in sending only one copy, noting that "[t]he mechanic's and
materialman's lien statutes must be liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers
and materialmen." Id at 288.
192. Id. The court held that the liens under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5469
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (current version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.101-.105
(Vernon Pam. 1983)) enjoyed a preference over the lien of a general contractor since all liens
had a common time of inception and the retainage fund was created to be a fund to pay
mechanics, materialmen, and artisans if the general contractor defaulted. 653 S.W.2d at
288.
193. 648 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
194. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5452, § I (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (current ver-
sion at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
195. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § I (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (current ver-
sion at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.123 (Vernon P1am. 1983)).
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him a preference lien on removables furnished under his contract, and
for which he is responsible, for the entire amount due him for the
materials and labor furnished by him under that contract, even
though some of the items furnished are not removable. 196
Condemnation. In Zinsmeyer v. State197 the State of Texas brought a con-
demnation suit to acquire land for highway expansion. The Zinsmeyers
owned a 1.308 acre tract of land that had been conveyed by warranty deed
to Mr. Zinsmeyer from his father. Included in the deed was an easement
granting Zinsmeyer the use of a water well located on the father's highway
frontage property. The highway expansion project affected .392 acres of
Zinsmeyer's land and that portion of his father's land on which the ease-
ment lay. The Zinsmeyers received $3500 as compensation for the value
of the land taken and for damages to the remaining property. They ob-
jected to the award, which stated that it included water rights and ease-
ments whether or not they were located on the Zinsmeyers' land. The
Zinsmeyers appealed the award and obtained a trial as to the value of the
remaining land and improvements after the taking. The jury found that
the damage to the remaining property was zero.
On appeal, the San Antonio court of appeals held that the trial court
erred in refusing to submit the landowners' requested special instruction
advising the jury not to consider any payment made to Zinsmeyer's father
for the taking of his water well. 198 The court stated that an easement is an
interest in land, and an easement owner is entitled to compensation if the
easement is extinguished by a taking, regardless of whether the servient
estate owner is paid for the taking of his own estate. 199 Because of the
failure of the trial court to delineate the ownership rights of the easement
holders and the owner of the servient estate, the case was reversed and
remanded. 200
Brokers. In Texas an unlicensed real estate broker who acts as an agent
and collects a commission is liable to the aggrieved party for the amount of
the commission plus a penalty of not more than three times the amount of
such commission. 2° 1 The Waco court of appeals in Holloman v. Denson 
202
196. 648 S.W.2d at 371.
197. 646 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
198. Id at 629. The court indicated that when a jury sits as a factfinder, it is the court's
duty to determine the nature and extent of the property condemned and to instruct the jury
regarding the rules of compensation or damages applicable to the particular case. Id; see
Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Krueger, 441 S.W.2d 940, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969,
writ reFd n.r.e.).
199. 646 S.W.2d at 628-29; see also Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Shell Pipeline
Corp., 578 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]) (easement owner entitled
to compensation upon governmental taking), aft'd, 591 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1979); Ruble v.
San Antonio, 479 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.) (court
should instruct as to nature of easement); ef City of Dallas v. Anderson, 570 S.W.2d 62, 64-
65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (judge's failure to instruct fully regarding
condemnor's easement rights requires reversal).
200. 646 S.W.2d at 629.
201. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 19(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984); see Persky v.
Greever, 202 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, writ refd n.r.e.) ("aggrieved"
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held that, for purposes of the recovery of a real estate commission, an ag-
grieved person is one who is sold real estate by an unlicensed individ-
ual.20 3 The court stated:
A person hiring a real estate agent is seeking to employ services of an
expert who has been tested and found to be such, and if, unknown to
him, he gets a person who has not been tested and found to be an
expert, but is charged the full commission rate, that person has suf-
fered a loss since he did not get what he was paying for.2°4
In Holloman the Densons had entered into three real estate transactions
with Holloman, who was not licensed as a real estate broker. The Densons
filed three separate suits, which were consolidated for purposes of the trial.
The first suit involved a claim by the Densons for $2500 in earnest money
that they paid for a lake lot in a transaction that was never completed. In
the second suit the Densons sought to recover a commission paid to Hollo-
man by a third party in connection with that third party's sale of his house
to the Densons. The third suit was to recover statutory penalties as a result
of commissions the Densons paid to Holloman in connection with the sale
of their house.
The court found that the Densons were entitled to the return of the ear-
nest money paid for the purchase of the lake lot. 20 5 The Densons were
also entitled to recovery of damages for the commissions they had paid,
because they were aggrieved persons within the meaning of article
6573a.206 The Densons were found not to be aggrieved, however, where
the commission was paid by the third party to Holloman, because it was no
concern of the Densons whether the party from whom they purchased
their house paid a commission to Holloman.20 7
Pace v. State208 resolved the question of whether treble damages under
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)20 9 are payable from the Real
Estate Recovery Fund210 because of misrepresentations made by a real
estate broker. The Texas Supreme Court relied on the wording of the Act
itself to find that, because the Real Estate License Act states that the fund
is to be used to reimburse persons who have suffered monetary damage as
a result of unscrupulous acts of real estate agents or brokers, treble dam-
ages under the DTPA, as punitive damages, are not recoverable. 2" Dam-
ages assessed to punish or as an example to others are not the same as
funds expended to restore aggrieved persons who suffer monetary
means having a substantial grievance because of legal injustice or denial of some equitable
or legal right).
202. 640 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
203. Id. at 420.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 421.
206. Id. at 420.
207. Id
208. 650 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1983).
209. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(B) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
210. The Real Estate Recovery Fund was established as part of the Real Estate License
Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
211. 650 S.W.2d at 65.
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damages. 2 12
A second question resolved in Pace involved the amount of recovery
allowed an individual under the Real Estate License Act. When the Act
became effective in 1975, the maximum recovery allowed to any individual
was $10,000.213 By amendment effective September 1, 1979, the maximum
amount recoverable was increased to $20,000.214 The court held that the
language of the Act itself makes clear that the date of the act or acts giving
rise to a cause of action determines the maximum amount of recovery. 215
In Pace, because the acts that gave rise to the judgment occurred before
September 1, 1979, $10,000 was the maximum amount recoverable. 216
In Corman v. Carlson2t 7 a real estate broker sued the co-owner of a
shopping center to recover a commission he allegedly earned for negotiat-
ing a lease on premises within the center. The Dallas court of appeals,
reversing the trial court, held that a broker is not entitled to recover a
commission when the only writing containing the parties' agreement for
payment of a commission fails to satisfy the statute of frauds. 218 The
agreement to pay a real estate commission in this case was set forth in a
letter stating that the commission was to be paid for negotiating the lease
of a doughnut store at the Richardson East Shopping Center.219 The court
held this description insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, which re-
quires a writing to contain, within itself or by reference to some other ex-
isting writing, a reasonably certain description of the property to be
transferred. 220 A writing, describing land only as a part of a larger tract,
without specific data by which to identify the tract to be sold or leased, will
not satisfy the statute of frauds.22 1
212. Id. See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R. 4TH 801 (1983).
213. Act of May 19, 1975, ch. 216, § 8, pt. 8(c), 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 542 (amended
1979).
214. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 8, pt. 8(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
215. 650 S.W.2d at 65-66. The Act provides that the fund is "for reimbursing aggrieved
persons who suffer monetary damages by reason of certain acts committed by a . . . real
estate broker or salesman ... provided the broker or salesman was licensed by the State of
Texas at the time the act was committed .. " TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 8,
pt. l(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (emphasis by the court).
216. 650 S.W.2d at 65-66; see also Texas Real Estate Comm'n v. Lamb, 650 S.W.2d 66
(Tex. 1983) (supreme court reaffirmed holding in Pace that date of acts committed, not date
of judgment, controls amount recoverable from Real Estate Recovery Fund).
217. 638 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
218. Id. at 22.
219. The letter provided:
This letter is to serve as our commission agreement for negotiating a lease with
Denny's Inc. for a donut store at the Richardson East Shopping Center lo-
cated at Belt Line and Piano Road in Richardson, Texas.
Mr. Brown and Mr. Corman agree to pay Bob Carlson the commission
amount of $8,424.
Id
220. Id; see Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 56-57, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1945) (writing or
memorandum insufficient to comply with statute unless it furnishes within itself, or by refer-
ence to some other existing writing, means or data by which land to be sold may be identi-
fied with reasonable certainty).
221. 638 S.W.2d at 22; see also Bayer v. McDade, 610 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("50 acres, more or less" in larger tract held insuffi-
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Rahmberg v. McLean222 interpreted section 20(a) of the Real Estate Li-
cense Act. 223 That section states that a person may not maintain an action
for the collection of brokerage and other real-estate-related commissions
unless he proves he was a duly licensed real estate broker or salesman at
the time he commenced the alleged services.224 The defendant in
Rahmberg argued that in order for a person to maintain an action for the
collection of brokerage-related commissions, he had to allege and prove
that he was a duly licensed broker or salesman at the time the cause of
action arose. The court interpreted the Act, however, to require that the
individual be duly licensed at the time the alleged services were com-
menced. 225 Thus the broker, who was licensed when she procured the
original listing but whose license had lapsed for nonpayment of licensing
fees by the time the contract was executed, was entitled to recover a
commission.226
Condominiums. In Dutcher v. Owens 227 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed a question of first impression regarding the allocation of liability
among condominium 228 co-owners for tort claims arising out of the owner-
ship, use, and maintenance of common elements. 229 The court rejected the
lower court's holding that condominium unit owners have joint and sev-
eral liability230 and held instead that the liability of a co-owner for claims
involving management of the common areas is limited to his pro rata in-
terest in the condominium as a whole.23' The court found that both the
Texas Condominium Act 232 and Texas case law are silent as to tort liabil-
cient description). But see James v. Baron Indus., Inc., 605 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (description in listing agreement identify-
ing property as "Willowwick Place patio homes and the five (5) townhomes on Nantucket"
held sufficient).
222. 640 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
223. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
224. Id
225. 640 S.W.2d at 403.
226. Id. at 402-03; cf Reyna v. Gonzalez, 630 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi
1982, no writ) (section 1(d) of Real Estate License Act requires denial of real estate salesper-
son's claim for commission based on sale of property listed but not contracted for until after
termination of his employment).
227. 647 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. 1983).
228. "Condominium" means the separate ownership of single units or apartments in a
multiple unit structure or structures with common elements. Texas Condominium Act, TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 81.002(3) (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, § 2(d) (Vernon 1980)). It is actually a combination of two estates in
real property, a fee simple in a portion of the multiple unit structure and a tenancy in com-
mon with other co-owners in the common elements. 647 S.W.2d at 949 (citing Scott v. Wil-
liams, 607 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (co-owners
hold as tenants in common)).
229. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 81.002(6)-(7) (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified
at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, § 2(l)-(m) (Vernon 1980)) (defining portions of
buildings and grounds considered "general" or "limited" common elements).
230. Owens v. Dutcher, 635 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982), rev'd, 647
S.W.2d 948 (Tex. 1983).
231. 647 S.W.2d at 951.
232. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001-.210 (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a (Vernon 1980)).
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ity,233 and looked to California law to buttress its conclusion that, given
the unique type of ownership that condominiums involve, the onus of lia-
bility for injury should reflect the degree of control exercised by co-owners,
which, in the instant situation, was very slight.234
In Board of Directors of By the Sea Council of Co-Owners, Inc. v.
Sondock 235 certain condominium apartment owners brought suit to enjoin
the condominium board of directors from removing carports and to com-
pel the board to repair the carports. The main issues in the case were the
validity of an amendment to the condominium declaration2 36 and the ne-
cessity of joinder of all owners in the condominium project in a suit that
affects the interests of the absent owners.2 37 The declaration amendment
purported to give the board authority to cover or uncover parking spaces,
which were common elements of the condominium project. 238 The appel-
lees contended that the right to the parking facilities constituted a vested
property right and that removal of the covers, because it would decrease
each owner's percentage of undivided interest in that common element,
required approval of one hundred percent of the owners. The court re-
jected the idea that a decrease in percentage ownership would result from
the removal of the covers239 and, since no Texas case was directly in point,
looked to the law of other jurisdictions in concluding that the declaration
was properly amended.2 40 The court held that the unit owners purchased
233. 647 S.W.2d at 951. The court of appeals had also noted the silence, but found in the
nature of condominium ownership the basis for joint and several liability, stating that "(i]n
the absence of a statutory limitation, there appears to be no escape-proof method of insulat-
ing the unit owners in a condominium regime from unlimited liability .... Owens v.
Dutcher, 635 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982).
234. 647 S.W.2d at 950 (citing White v. Cox, 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 830, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259,
262 (1971)). The California court noted that it "would be sacrificing reality to theoretical
formalism" to conclude that a condominium unit owner had any effective control over the
common elements. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
235. 644 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
236. The condominium declaration was adopted pursuant to the Texas Condominium
Act, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001-.210 (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a (Vernon 1980)), and was amended pursuant to paragraph
40 of the by-laws, which permitted amendments "with the written consent of Unit Owners
... who in the aggregate own at least 66 'A% of the common elements .... 644 S.W.2d
at 779 & n.2.
237. Id. at 776.
238. Id.; see also Texas Condominium Act, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 81.002(6)-(7)
(Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, § 2(l)-(m)
(Vernon 1980)) (definition of general and limited common elements).
239. 644 S.W.2d at 781.
240. See Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 695, 700 (1978) (bylaws amendment reasonable where enabling declarations specifi-
cally provided for amendment); Seagate Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (unique problems of condominia necessitate greater degree of
control over individual ownership rights); Kroop v. Caravelle Condominium, Inc., 323 So.
2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (owner acquired title with knowledge that declara-
tion might be amended and therefore constitutional rights not violated); Mayfair Eng'g Co.
v. Park, 318 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (fee ownership of limited common
elements subject to use restrictions in condominium declaration); Hidden Harbor Estates,
Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (unit owners must give up
certain degree of freedom of choice).
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their units subject to applicable law and to the terms of the recorded decla-
ration, which specifically provided that the by-laws and the declaration
could be amended by a two-thirds vote. 241 This holding apparently has
resulted in the amendment to the Texas Condominium Act that is dis-
cussed below.
III. LEGISLATION
Property Code. During the survey period the legislature enacted a state
Property Code,242 intended to be a nonsubstantive codification and revi-
sion of Texas property law statutes relating to real and personal prop-
erty.2 4 3 The Code contains ten titles covering general provisions,
conveyances, public records, actions and remedies, liens and exempt prop-
erty, escheat, condominiums, landlord and tenant, trusts, and miscellane-
ous beneficial property interests. It attempts to clarify the statutes by
restating them in modern American English, rearranging them into a more
logical order, employing a format and numbering system meant to facili-
tate citation, and eliminating repealed, duplicative, unconstitutional, out-
dated, or ineffective provisions. 2 " The Code Construction Act 24 5 applies
to construction of the Code.246 A committee of the State Bar Real Estate,
Probate, and Trust Law Section is reviewing the Property Code to deter-
mine whether substantive changes were inadvertently made.
247
Condominiums. The Sixty-Eighth Legislature considered, but rejected,
major revisions to the Texas Condominium Act 24 8 that would have
brought Texas law closer to that of the proposed Uniform Condominium
Act.249 During the special summer session, however, the legislature, ap-
parently in response to the Sondock case, 250 amended section 6(b) of the
Act to provide that "[a] condominium association may not alter or destroy
a unit or a limited common element without the consent of all owners af-
fected and the first lien mortgagees of all affected owners. '' 251 Section 7(B)
of the Act was also amended, and section 7(D) was added to require con-
241. 644 S.W.2d at 779, 781.
242. Property Code, ch. 576, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3475 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
243. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 1.001(a) (Vernon Pam. 1983).
244. Id.
245. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
246. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 1.002 (Vernon Pam. 1983).
247. Editor's Message, STATE BAR NEWSLETTER, REAL ESTATE, PROBATE AND TRUST
LAW, Oct. 1983, at 2. The committee is chaired by J.R. Schneider.
248. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a (Vernon 1980) (codified before amendment
in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001-.210 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
249. St. Claire, The Proposed Texas Uniform Condominium Act, 46 TEX. B.J. 44 (1983)
(comparison of existing Condominium Act with proposed legislation).
250. Board of Directors of By the Sea Council of Co-Owners, Inc. v. Sondock, 644
S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1982, writ refd n.r.e.); see supra notes 235-41 and
accompanying text.
251. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 724, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4487, 4488 (amending TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, § 6(b) (Vernon 1980), now codified before amendment in
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.104, .107 (Vernon Pam. 1983)) (emphasis added).
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dominium declarations to provide that any amendment to the declaration
must be approved at an owners' meeting by the holders of at least sixty-
seven percent of the ownership interests. 252 The amendments raise certain
questions, including the meaning of "all owners affected" and the validity
of the practice of "phasing" in the development of condominiums in sepa-
rate stages. In any event, the amendments, as a practical matter, will re-
quire developers to employ an effective proxy system to obtain the
required two-thirds vote for amendments in light of the fact that meetings
of owners are often poorly attended.
Urban Homesteads. Amendments to the Texas Constitution 25 3 and the
Homestead Exemption Law254 redefined urban homesteads in terms of
size instead of value. Under old law an urban homestead was defined as a
lot or lots with a value not exceeding ten thousand dollars at the time of
designation as a homestead. The amendments provide that an urban
homestead is limited to one acre or less, together with its improvements,
irrespective of the dollar value of the lot or the improvements and regard-
less of the date on which the homestead was created.255
Filing of Foreclosure Notice. The legislature also amended the Texas stat-
ute regulating the sale of real property under a contractual power of
sale. 256 The statute retains requirements for a valid foreclosure under a
deed of trust but, in addition, a copy of the notice of trustee's sale must
now be filed at the office of the county clerk of the county in which the sale
is to be made at least twenty-one days preceding the date of the sale. 257
Furthermore, the clerk must make all such notices available for public
inspection. 258
Easements, Zoning, and Political Subdivisions. The Texas Natural Re-
sources Code now has a new chapter permitting parties to grant and con-
vey "conservation easements. '259  Such easements are nonpossessory
interests in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations
252. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 724, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4487, 4489 (amending TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, § 7(B) (Vernon 1980), now codified before amendment in
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.102, .104 (Vernon Pam. 1983), and adding TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, § 7(D)).
253. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 was amended by voters on November 8, 1983, as pro-
posed by Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 6724.
254. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 976, §§ 1-4, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5309, 5309-10 (amending
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), now codified before
amendment in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
255. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (language of amendment in Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 1983
Tex. Gen. Laws 6724); Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 976, §§ 1-4, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5309,
5309-10 (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), now
codified before amendment in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
256. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 915, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5056, 5056-57 (amending
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), now codified before
amendment in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
257. Id.
258. Id
259. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 434, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2438 (enacting chapter 183).
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designed to maintain open spaces, protect natural resources, enhance air or
water quality, or preserve the historical, architectural, archeological, or
cultural aspects of real property.2 60 In a similar vein cities and incorpo-
rated villages may now impose zoning restrictions to protect and preserve
sites, buildings, and areas of architectural importance, as well as those of
historical and cultural importance.261 Other legislation2 62 now encourages
private investment in certain designated economically depressed areas
("enterprise zones") 263 by providing incentives in the form of reduced or
eliminated taxes and fees, 2 6 4 regulatory relief,265 and preferences for state
grants or loans and lease opportunities at nominal rentals.266
Several items of recent legislation concern subdivisions. A city gov-
erning body may now issue an amending plat authorizing a relocation of
lot lines if the owner or owners of all affected lots join in the application
for plats amendment, as long as the amendment neither removes recorded
covenants or restrictions nor increases the number of lots. 267 A county
commissioners court may cancel a subdivision, upon application of the
owner or owners of seventy-five percent of the affected land area, after
three weeks' notice and public meeting, provided it is shown that the revi-
sion or cancellation will not interfere with established rights of any land
owner within the subdivision. 268 Only persons directly affected by the can-
cellation may maintain an injunction action.269 An action extending gov-
ernmental control of subdivisions requires plats from all landowners
planning to subdivide outside city limits in all counties, rather than merely
in counties having a population of less than 190,000 people. 270 In addi-
tion, road-width minimum requirements have been extended 271 and an
optional system of subdivision controls is available for certain counties.2 72
Plats filed before September 1, 1983, are governed by the prior provisions
of article 6626a. 273
Brokers. The Real Estate License Act previously provided that a salesper-
son had to be in the employ of the broker under whom he was licensed at
the time the compensation was earned and at the time the compensation
was paid. 274 An amendment now allows a salesperson to accept compen-
260. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 183 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
261. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1011(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
262. Texas Enterprise Zone Act, ch. 841, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4771 (codified at TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5190.7 (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
263. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5190.7, §§ 3(6), 4-20 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
264. Id §§ 9-14.
265. Id. § 15.
266. Id. § 16.
267. Id. art. 974(a), § 3.
268. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6626d(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
269. Id. art. 6626d(c).
270. Id. art. 6626a, § 1(b).
271. Id. §3.
272. Id art. 6626a.1.
273. Act of June 16, 1983, ch. 327, § 5, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1717, 1724-25; see TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6626a (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1982-1983).
274. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 1(d) (Vernon 1969).
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sation from a broker for whom he no longer works, as long as the right to
compensation accrued while he was employed. 275 The Act now also per-
mits brokers to complete contract forms binding a real estate transaction, if
such forms are promulgated by the Texas Real Estate Commission or pre-
pared by a licensed Texas attorney.276
Fraud-Real Estate and Stock Transactions. A person who makes a false
representation or false promise with respect to a real estate or stock trans-
action is now liable to the person defrauded for actual damages by reason
of his awareness of the falsity of his statement, without proof of "willful-
ness," under section 27 of the Business and Commerce Code. 277 Exem-
plary damages may be imposed on a person who benefits from false
representations or promises made by another that such person knows of
and fails to disclose.278 In each instance actual awareness may be inferred
from objective manifestations of awareness. 279 Attorneys' fees and costs
are now recoverable under section 27(e). 280
Sale of Minor's Property. A probate court may now grant permission to
sell a minor's real or personal property when the value of the minor's inter-
est does not exceed ten thousand dollars. 28' Previous law permitted a sale
only when the value of the property exceeded ten thousand dollars.282
Mechanics'Liens. Attorneys' fees and other reasonable costs of collection
are now recoverable if a properly fixed mechanic's or materialman's lien is
not paid within 180 days from perfection. 283 If the lien is not properly
perfected, however, the owner, surety, contractor, or subcontractor against
whom the lien was filed may recover reasonable fees and costs of defend-
ing against the lien claimant. 284
Carn-St. Germain. One item of federal legislation that became law in late
1982 is of interest. Section 341 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Insti-
tutions Act of 1982 provides for federal preemption of state laws and judi-
cial decisions that restrict the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in real
property loans,285 except for loans originating or assumed during a "win-
275. Act of May 20, 1983, ch. 169, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 724, 725 (codified at TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 1(d) (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
276. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 16(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
277. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
278. id § 27.
279. Id.
280. Id. § 27(e).
281. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 339A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
282. Id. § 339A(a) (Vernon 1980).
283. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 763, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4574, 4574 (amending TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), now codified before amendment
in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.052, .055-.058, .083 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
284. Id
285. Garn-St. Germain Act § 341, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982). Section 341 was effective
Oct. 15, 1982.
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dow period. ' 286 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board issued regula-
tions287 to implement the Act, one of which lists the restrictions imposed
by the Act on the exercise of a due-on-sale option and limits applicability
of the restrictions to loans made on homes occupied or to be occupied by
the borrower. 288 In addition, the regulations provide that a lender "[s]hall
not impose a prepayment penalty or equivalent fee for or in connection
with acceleration of the loan by exercise of a due-on-sale clause. ' 289 In
light of two recent Texas cases 290 upholding due-on-sale laws in Texas
mortgage instruments, the Act is of less import here than in many other
states. The Act, however, would seem to impact due-on-sale clauses like
that in Metropolitan Savings & Loan Association v. Nabours.291 Some com-
mentators have suggested that the outcome in Nabours would be different
under the Act and the regulations because the due-on-sale clause would be
enforceable and only the prepayment penalty would be unenforceable.
292
286. Id.
287. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554, 32,160 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 556, 590, 591).
288. 48 Fed. Reg. at 21,559. Thus, construction and other commercial loans are not sub-
ject to the restrictions listed in the Act, § 341(d)(1)-(9), 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982).
289. 48 Fed. Reg. at 32,161-62 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(2)).
290. Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1982) (not unreason-
able restraint on alienation); Crestview, Ltd v. Foremost Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (not unreasonable for lender to condition transfer ap-
proval upon increase in interest rate or prepayment of certain magnitude).
291. 652 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.); see supra notes 177-81
and accompanying text.
292. Bloodworth & Santos, Recent Case Developments 1-20 (Univ. of Texas Law School
Mortgage Lending Inst. 1983).
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